Abstract
Introduction
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is a technology highly demanded in numerous applications and domains and therefore is under a continuous and rapid development [1] [2] [3] [4] . Securing RFID tags against security threats is considered the main obstacle facing the widespread adoption of RFID technology [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] , where hundreds of RFID protocols have been proposed and focused on providing a secure contact between readers and tags over the insecure radio channel. Nevertheless, due to the limitations of tags in terms of circuitry (gate equivalents), storage, and power consumption, the design of an efficient and secure mutual authentication protocol presents an immense challenge. Designing security protocols is even more challenging for low-cost technologies such as the lightweight RFID security protocolswhereby the tags imposes stronger hardware and memory limitations. Among the set of risks linked to RFID technology, privacy and de-synchronization are the most challenging as the majority of designed protocols fail to offer protection against these threats.
RFID tags compliant with EPC Class-1 Generation-2 (Gen-2 in short ) are based on transponders with limited resources. In detail, Gen-2 tags only support a 16-bit pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), a 16-bit cyclic redundancy check code (CRC), and bitwise operations such as XOR, AND, and OR [12] .
Several protocols were proposed with the aim of securing Gen-2 tags. Unfortunately the majority of these protocols failed either to fulfill Gen-2 requirements or to satisfy the claimed security properties. For instance, [13] presented a protocol using a PIN password to securize the communication. This protocol suffers from several attacks as the ones mentioned in [14] and [15] . First, it was vulnerable to a de-synchronization attack as a consequence of the weak updating mechanism of the secret keys and shared values. Secondly, it does not offer protection against replay attacks and a passive attacker can reuse tokens from previous sessions. Thirdly, it was susceptible to a traceability attack since tags respond with the same value every time -in this attack, the attacker has to intercept the updating message and the tag would respond with a constant value. [16] aims to secure EPC Class-1 Gen-2 standard. Similar to many previously proposed protocols, it can be categorized under the class of lightweight mutual authentication protocols, following the classification proposed in [17] . In this category, it is assumed that tags can generate a random number but they do not have the computational resources to support on-board hash function. On the other hand, and similar to other lightweight RFID authentication protocols, Yeh et al.'s scheme is designed with a new parameter representing a database index value.
Vulnerability of Yeh et al.'s Protocol
Naser et al. [18] showed how the protocol is vulnerable against de-synchronization and impersonation attacks. The attacks can be conducted by a malicious reader, which mainly forwards message and does simple modifications exploiting the weaknesses of the bitwise XOR operations.
De-synchronization Attack
Yeh et al.'s protocol was designed using two sets of authentication and access keys to combat DoS attack, which causes a de-synchronization state between the tag and the server. The authors in [16] criticized the fact that its predecessor scheme (i.e., Chien and Huang's protocol [14] ) updated the key values (K old and P old ) on every successful mutual authentication session at the database side. Motivated by this, Yeh et al. proposed to add a validation criterion for this updating mechanism to solve the de-synchronization attack, which Chien and Chen's protocol suffer, and is based on the usage of the new values of D, E, and C i . Nevertheless, despite these validation tokens, we, in this paper, show how replay attacks can de-synchronize the protocol. The used adversary (malicious reader) has to be able to interrupt and forward messages only, and it does not need to have the capability to communicate with the database. This adversary will execute two session procedures in one session. That is, both communication sessions are executed almost in parallel but with only a slight difference in time:
In the (i+1) th authentication session, the malicious reader will intercept the last message from the database and throw away M 2 message to keep the tag using the same index value C i+1 . At the same time, the database will update its local parameters, specifically C old would be C new , and C i+1 , and its C new would be C i+2 .
In a slightly posterior session (almost a parallel session), the malicious reader will resend a new Message 3. However, instead of containing (V, M1, D, C i , E, N R ), it will send (V, M1, DRND, C i , ERND, N R ), which will allow the database to understand that it is a new session. These values (i.e., V, M1, DRND, C i , ERND, and NR) will facilitate the tag to be authenticated by the database because N R continues to represent the same values from the eavesdropped session. N T will become NTRND, which is correctly used in D and E messages. Due to modified Message 3 sent by the reader, the database will update its C new value based on the C x (in this case, X=old) from C i+2 to C i+3 . At the same time, the malicious reader will forward the stored M2 message to the tag, causing the tag to update its values from (K i+1 , P i+1 and C i+1 ) to (K i+2 , P i+2 and C i+2 ).
At this step the tag will store C i+2 as index value, and the database will keep the values C i+1 and C i+3 . Therefore, the tag and the database lost its synchronization and this is permanent. In fact, the tag can never be identified because the search index stored into its memory is different from the two indices (old and new) stored in the database.
Impersonation Attack
Tag impersonation attack is conducted by a dishonest reader. The key points of this attack are based on the use of N T nonce in both D and E tokens and the abusive use of the bitwise XOR operations. Bitwise operations like XOR are linear functions, which are vulnerable to active and passive attacks. The proposed attack is sketched below: a) (i + 1) th authentication phase The attack can be performed using two methods. The first is by preventing the reader from forwarding any messages to the tag. Alternatively, the adversary can interrupt the last message and send a fraudulent message containing an incorrect value of M2. At this point, the targeted tag is isolated and the malicious reader can replace and impersonate the original tag by computing simple bitwise XOR operations as described in the following.
b) (i + n) th authentication phase (n>2) Basically the fraudulent reader simulates that the tag always incorrectly receives the message M2. Therefore, the updating phase is not run in the tag and previous M1 message is valid. M1, D, E, N R , and V are the picked values of a previous legitimate session. After the reception of M2, the reader block this message and simulates the tag incorrectly received M2. After that, the fraudulent reader sends M1, DRND, ERND, N R , V, where RND represents an arbitrary random value. The tag is authenticated since M1 is legitimate. The random number N T ' associated to this session is the bitwise XOR between N T and RND. We sketch the process below:
The proposed attack can be executed indefinitely as the original scheme does not assume any threshold for the number of times the M2 message can be interrupted, altered, or incorrectly received.
Research Method
In an accumulative effort to enhance the security of Yeh et al.'s protocol, we propose two possible solutions for the desynchronization threat. The first is the creation of two extra fields for each tag's record in the database as a short memory for random numbers (N R , N T ) generated in the (i+1) th session. The short memory using these two extra fields (N R_last , N T_last ) indicates that they will be overwritten at every successful mutual authentication (i+2) th session. The second solution involves the modification of the formulas for D and E values, executed by the tag, as not to be able to misuse or manipulate these during transaction (e.g., by using a nonrectangular function such as a rotation function). However, these proposed solutions are not completely effective; other attacks can be configured based on the original protocol plot design, which depends on updating values of common secrets between tag and backend database.
Motivated by the abovementioned disadvantage in enhancing Yeh et al.'s protocol, a new protocol was developed utilizing the strengths and addressing the weaknesses of existing protocols, particularly the vulnerabilities in the said protocol (See Figure 1) . The goal in creating the new protocol was to produce a lightweight one with higher security level and lower computational power requirements for the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard for RFID tags. The protocol presents transactions of the original stored data combined with random values, and encapsulated in shell values capable of transporting hidden data between the tag and the reader without compromising or revealing this data. Based on its characteristics, the proposed protocol is named as Shelled Lightweight Randomized Value (SLRV), which focuses on securing the channel between the tag and the reader, the reader and the database, and viceversa. We introduce the following notations for the protocol: a) Ψ : encryption value holding the EPC S b) K e : encryption key with fixed value for all tags stored in the database c) N i : random number generated by the database at every (i) th session d) R temp :
temporary value calculated by the database at every (i+1) th session e) K1, K2: two distinct secret keys with fixed values for each tag stored in the tag and the corresponding record in the database We recommend that these two secret keys (K 1 , K 2 ) be changed from time to time to maintain a higher security level. The protocol consists of the following phases:
Initialization Phase
For each tag, denoted as Tag x , the manufacturer randomly generates two secret keys and EPC S values and stores these in the tag in a corresponding record in the database identified by EPC S . The manufacturer likewise generates an encryption key K e and stores it in the database, generates a random number and stores it in the tag as N i , and generates an encryption value using the formula Ψ=ENC(EPC S N i ) Ke and stores it in the tag as Ψ.
In the (i + 1) th tag authentication phase 1) R Tag x : N R The reader generates a nonce random N R to the tag as a challenge. Upon receiving N R , the tag generates a random number N T to be used in the following formulas:
Where α i is used to hide N T and β i is used to check the message integrity by the database.
2) Tag R: Ψ i , α i , β i and N i When the reader receives the message, it will compute V value using V=H(RIDN R ), which is the hashed value of the reader's ID (RID) XORed with N R . The reader then forwards it with contents of Messages 1 and 2 to the backend database for the purpose of tag identification.
3) R  DB: Ψ i , α i , N i , β i ,V, and N R Once Message 3 is received, the database performs the following operations sequentially, where each is conditioned to the success of its predecessor operation or else will abort the session:
Reader Authentication Phase
The database iteratively picks up each stored RID and computes H(RIDN R ) to authenticate the reader based on the value of V.For each RID in DB test the following formula: H(RIDN R )=? V
Tag Identification Phase
The database extracts EPC S value using the following formula: The reader uses this formula to extract EPCs by decrypting Ψ i using K e and N i , and locks up the tag's corresponding secret keys in the database. Subsequently, it starts the mutual authentication phase only if the EPCs are verified.
Tag Authentication Phase
The database uses the values it acquired (EPC S , K 1 , K 2 ) and resolves A i shell by inversing the function A i =ROT(ROT(N T EPC S K 1 , N R^K2 ), N R K 1 ) to extract the value of the random number N T . Next, the reader checks the integrity of the message by verifying B i value using the following formula: PRNG(N T ||N R ||EPCs||Ψ i )K 2 =? β i
Tag updating Phase
The database authenticates the tag, creates a new random value (N i+1 ), and uses K 1 , K 2 , and N T to calculate R temp using the following formula:
The database then creates new tag parameters for the values (Ψ i+1 , γ i , and Info) sequentially using the following:
Where γ i is used to check the message integrity by the database. 1) DBR:Ψ i+1 , γ i , N i+1 , and Info When the reader receives Message 4, it obtains DATA from the info field by inversing the formula DATA=infoRID using the RID stored in it. It forwards Ψ i+1 , γ i+1 , N i+1 to the tag.
2) R Tag:
When Message 5 is delivered, the tag recalculates N temp using the following formula:
Next, the tag checks the integrity of the message by verifying G i value using the following formula:
If γ i value verification failed, the tag presumes manipulation in the message and therefore aborts the session. Otherwise, the tag completes mutual authentication, authenticates the database, and concludes the session in the final phase (Tag Updating) by updating its values and overwriting the old values as the following:
As illustrated in Figure 1 , two shells (α and γ) are generated in every session. This makes the embedded values difficult to predict, and these values would be useless if obtained after the session is terminated. Furthermore, there are three verification tokens -V, β, and γ -that allow the system to terminate unsuccessful session in four positions: EPCs lock up in reader authentication, tag identification, tag authentication, and tag updating. These tokens start a new session in another timeframe.
Security Analysis
We conducted security analysis against the most relevant threats discussed in previous literature. Analysis was conducted by investigating each attack and its requirements and properties in the following categories:
User data confidentiality: Secret keys K 1 and K 2 are carefully hidden inside α, β, and γ. In every new session, the keys are mixed with two different random numbers N T and N R . Moreover, if any of the sub-messages in α, β, or γ was broken, tag identity will remain anonymous to the adversary. This is because the tag EPCs was XORed with a random number and subsequently encrypted using a secret key that exists only in the reader's database. Therefore, the tag's identity can be recognized only by legitimate readers. Tag anonymity: Sub-messages are updated in every session's transaction, and tagreader-database messages are mixed with random numbers. As a result, the adversary is unable to recognize the tag's location or trace it unless the adversary continues to interrupt the communication between the same tag and any legitimate reader; this leads to the transmission of the same message values of Ψ i and N i every time. This scenario was not considered of any considerable value and had been ignored in most previous studies in the domain since the tag was unable to randomize itself due to the limited recourse. An in-depth analysis of all these scenarios has been given in detail in [19] .
Mutual authentication and data integrity: Our mutual authentication protocol can be performed only between legitimate readers and legitimate tags owing to the sub-messages α, β, and γ; these are generated using the common secret keys K 1 and K 2 , which are only held in the tag and backend database and not communicated in plain values over an open channel. In addition, verifying the values of β and γ composed by the tag and the database, respectively, provides strong data integrity validation.
Forward security: It is not possible for an adversary to infer any data patterns from past communications among the tag, reader, and database. This is because any previous data sent in one session will have no meaning in any subsequent sessions; each message is based on a random number that is checked for integrity for the session it was created in. Therefore, the integrity check will recognize that the value is not created during the same session, and it consequently will terminate the session unsuccessfully. Moreover, Keys K 1 and K 2 are not dropped. However, they are difficult to obtain and can be changed frequently, rendering this attack quite impossible. Assuming the tag is somehow compromised; there remain several unknown data variables in the server, such as K e .
Resistance to replay attacks: An adversary may eavesdrop on any of the exchanged messages. However, it would not be useful to send it back to either the database or the tag. This is because each message is based on random numbers that are changed in every successful authentication session. Accordingly, a replay attack can be detected immediately once the message is received by either the tag or the database.
Data-update-confirmation and desynchronization: Majority of recent authentication protocols require updating the secret keys' values between the tag and reader. Cases where transmitted data had been modified or even interrupted lead to desynchronization. A desynchronization attack is the first vulnerability that commonly appears in all current protocols. In our protocol, the tag does not require updating of its local data in other entities. Moreover, even if any of these messages are modified or interrupted, any modification can be discovered easily when the values of V, β i , and γ i are verified. Interruptions will not make any difference because tag data will be updated only after receiving and verifying the last message. Thus, the reader is never affected and always obtains the original EPCs for every new session.
Resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks and disclosure attacks: Man-in-the-middle attacks can not affect SLRV protocol since all exchanged messages are verified and all modifications can be simply detected. Similarly, in a disclosure attack when an attacker makes changes in any message sent from database to tag or vice versa, SLRV protocol will detect any alteration and ignore the message.
A significant aspect of SLRV is that it is based on classical cryptography primitives on the database server's side. At the same time, the protocol is based on lightweight cryptography on the tag's side. More precisely, the protocol uses a combination of triangular and nontriangular functions. Non-triangular functions use a double-rotation function instead of the simple XOR function to obtain a greater diffusion effect and combat cryptanalysis of the protocol [12, 19] . Utilizing computational capabilities on the database server's side for using classical cryptography primitives and using a triangular and non-triangular functions collectively provide a higher security and protect against all known kinds of disclosure attacks that other protocols fail to defend against. Additionally, a meaningless message cannot affect the tag or reader, but only results in ending the current session unsuccessfully, enabling a new session to begin in another timeframe.
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Database loading: Finally, to cover all possible threats to SLRV, an adversary can perform database loading attacks by modifying any of the values in the message forwarded from the tag. This will either result in performing excessive EPCs lock-up processes in the database for invalid EPCs when manipulating the Ψ i or N i values, or in the verification of a manipulated PRNG value(s). However, this attack will not produce a significant effect because the SLRV uses a binary search algorithm for EPCs lockup, which is moderately fast where the lockup complexity is O(log n). Furthermore, the database in SLRV maintains the assumption that all values are fixed once added, EPCs are serialized, and data are indexed. Therefore, it results in a complexity value of O(1) for EPCs lockup, which minimizes the effect of DoS attacks.
Comparison with related protocols, such as Juels Protocol, Duc Protocol, etc., is summarized in Table 1 . SLRV covers well all aspects of security being considered from confidentiality to the database loading aspect. 
Conclusion
We have proposed SLRV as a new lightweight authentication protocol capable of providing transactions of shelled values able to transport encapsulated encrypted private data between the tag, the reader, and the database without compromising the data. This guarantees privacy and anonymity of the tags' holder. The main advantage offered by this protocol is that each session is considered an atom entity where no data from previous sessions are stored after session termination. In addition, no data values can be changed on the tag's side until all transactions have been executed and validated successfully, ensuring data integrity on the RFID tag, reader, and backend database entities at all times. Comparing to previous protocols in the lightweight RFID field, the proposed protocol (SLRV) covers all aspects of security.
Additionally, we urge protocol designers to check their protocols against compatibility with standards carefully (e.g., EPC-C1G2 or ISO/IEC 18006-C), bearing in mind that the design of a secure and efficient RFID authentication protocol is not a simple issue but a complicated challenge that requires in many cases a trade-off between objectives.
